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Abstract: Fire management has always meant fire
suppression to the managers of the chaparral
covered southern California National Forests.
Today, Forest Service fire management programs
must be cost effective, while wilderness fire
management objectives are aimed at recreating
natural fire regimes. A cost-effectiveness
analysis has been developed to compare fire
management options for meeting these objectives in
California's chaparral wilderness. This paper
describes the analytical procedure using examples
from a study currently being conducted for the Los
Padres National Forest, and discusses some
preliminary results.

The southern California National Forests (Los
Padres, Angeles, San Bernardino, and Cleveland)
were originally established to protect the area's
chaparral watersheds from fire, but now bear many
additional demands and values. For example, over
35 percent of the Los Padres National Forest is
designated or proposed wilderness. The goal of
fire management in Forest Service wilderness is
the restoration and continuance of natural fire
regimes (USDA Forest Service 1986). Fire is a
natural component of chaparral ecosystems. But,
restoring fire's natural role will be difficult
and expensive given past fire suppression policies
and present urban-wildland interface conditions.
Forest managers are now charged with restoring
this natural fire regime in a cost-effective
manner.
Prescribed lightning fire management,
prescribed burning, and the use of "appropriate
suppression responses" are legal wilderness fire
management options (USDA Forest Service 1984).
Prescribed lightning fire management is the use of
highly detailed prescriptions to monitor and
manage lightning fires. The prescriptions include
environmental conditions, air quality constraints,
fire and weather histories, limitations on size
and intensity, probability that the fire will

remain within acceptable size limits, safety of
firefighters and the public, and availability of
suppression forces if the fire leaves prescription
and must be suppressed. Prescribed burning is
similar to prescribed lightning fire management
except that Forest Service land managers ignite
the fires on their own time schedule when burning
conditions are optimal (which often means out of
the natural fire season).
Any fire not classified as a prescribed fire
is a wildfire and must receive an appropriate
suppression response. But, Forest Service policy
no longer requires this response to be intensive
suppression efforts aimed at keeping the fire as
small as possible (a control response), as a
wildfire can now be contained or confined.
Containment is to surround a fire with minimal
control lines and utilize natural barriers to stop
its spread. Confinement is to limit a fire's
spread to a predetermined area principally by the
use of natural barriers, preconstructed barriers,
and environmental conditions (USDA Forest Service
1984).
Southern California Forest managers are
planning to continue intensive suppression efforts
on wildfires and to maintain chaparral wilderness
fire regimes through prescribed burns (USDA Forest
Service 1988). However, appropriate suppression
responses or lightning fire management might be
more cost-effective approaches (that is, might
reduce the costs and impacts of fire suppression
and allow more acres to burn under natural
conditions). This paper has three main
objectives:
1. To describe a cost-effectiveness analysis
(CFA) to compare fire management options for
California's chaparral wilderness.
2. To illustrate its use through examples
from a study being undertaken for the San Rafael
and Dick Smith Wilderness Areas on the Los Padres
National Forest.
3. To discuss some of the preliminary
3
findings of the Los Padres Analysis.
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the Natural Resources Management Department at Cal
Poly, San Luis Obispo, and in cooperation with the
Los Padres National Forest. The final results of
this CEA will be available by April, 1989 from the
authors.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-109. 1989

BACKGROUND
Several economic models have been developed to
evaluate fire management programs (Saveland 1986;
Mills and Bratten 1982; USDA Forest Service
1987). Most of these models are intended for
large-scale fire management planning and cannot
evaluate the effects of anything less than
intensive suppression responses. Furthermore,
many are based on the "cost plus net value change"
(C + NVC) economic efficiency criterion.
For example, the National Fire Management
Analysis System (NFMAS--USDA Forest Service 1987)
is used for fire management planning by all
National Forests. NFMAS develops fire occurrence
probabilities from forestwide fire occurrence
histories, then uses computer models of fire
behavior and suppression efforts to determine
average annual suppression costs and burned areas
for different fire management budget levels and
management emphases (for example, allocating more
dollars for fuels management than for suppression
forces or prevention programs). From burned area
estimates, net resource value changes caused by
fire (NVCs) are calculated based on acreage burned
by intensity level. The budget level and
management emphasis which minimizes the sum of
fire management costs and NVCs is considered the
most efficient.
This type of analysis is inappropriate for
wilderness fire management planning for several
reasons. First, basing fire occurrence rates on
large area fire histories misrepresents the fire
regime of small, remote wilderness areas. The
greatest cause of fire on the Los Padres is arson,
while almost 80 percent of the fires in the Dick
Smith and San Rafael Wilderness Areas during the
past 25 years were remote lightning-caused fires,
often occurring under less than extreme fire
weather conditions (Los Padres fire reports from
1963-87).
Second, expected cost and burned area values
are derived from fire containment computer
programs. Two different programs are available,
but neither is capable of evaluating the effects
of any suppression response other than control.
Third, current limitations of Cost + Net Value
Change (C + NVC) evaluations make it inadequate
for wilderness fire management planning. C + NVC
is a cost-benefit economic efficiency analysis.
Cost-benefit analysis is a comparison of the costs
of meeting an objective against the returns or
benefits. In theory, economic efficiency is
achieved when the costs equal the benefits, or by
the minimization of the sum of the costs and
benifits (as in C + NVC). To be complete, a
cost-benefit analysis must include a measure of
all of the costs and all of the benefits (Williams
1973). To define the change in a resource's value
caused by fire, the value of the resource itself
must be defined. Currently, C + NVC evaluations
include values for most primary forest resources
such as timber, minerals, and forage. Net Value
Changes (NVCs) have also been placed on many
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wilderness outputs such as water, fish and
wildlife habitat, and recreational use. But,
these resources are only secondary outputs, or
by-products of wilderness (Saveland 1986).
Without a measure of the primary value of the
resource--wilderness itself in this case--a
cost-benefit analysis will be incomplete, and very
likely misleading (that is, the effects of fire on
these by-products is not the same as its effects
on a wilderness ecosystem).
Despite these problems, most of the work that
has been done on the economics of wilderness fire
is based on C + NVC (Condon 1985, Mills 1985).
One exception is an economic evaluation of fire
management options for a portion of the Frank
Church--River of No Return Wilderness Area
(Saveland 1986). This analysis is a
cost-effectiveness comparison of four different
fire management programs. The costs of each
alternative are the expected annual suppression
costs. And, "effectiveness" is the approximation
of the average "natural" annual burned area based
on what fire history studies reveal:
Plant communities require a certain amount of
fire, just as they require a certain amount of
precipitation .... Altering the average annual
burned area would be like altering the average
annual rainfall (Saveland 1986).
Though Saveland's analysis was for a different
fire regime, his definitions and much of his
methodology are appropriate for California's
chaparral.

COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
A cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), in its
truest form, is a comparison of the costs of
different alternatives, where each alternative
will meet the desired objectives, or have the same
effects. There are five key elements of a CEA:
the objectives; the alternatives; the costs; the
model; and a criterion for ranking the
alternatives (Quade 1967).

The Objective
The main objective of wilderness fire
management is to allow lightning fire to play, as
nearly as possible, its natural ecological role in
restoring the natural fire regime. Research
suggests that the natural fire return interval for
chaparral is about 30 years (Minnich 1983, Byrne
1979). The fire records of the Los Padres
(1911-1987) suggest that the chaparral burns every
45 years (USDA Forest Service 1988). The 45-year
rotation was chosen for this study. Using the 45year return interval, an average of over 5,000
acres (2024 ha) of the 231,500 acre (93,687 ha)
study area would have to burn annually.

The Alternatives
Four alternatives were chosen for the Los
Padres CEA. Alternative 1 is the Forest Service's
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past policy: Control all wildfires regardless of
cause, and attempt to meet annual burned area
objectives through prescribed burning.
Alternative 2 is the fire management strategy
proposed in the Los Padres' Land Management Plan:
Contain all fires which occur under low intensity
and control all moderate to high intensity fires,
while pursuing an active prescribed burning
program (USDA Forest Service 1988). Alternative
3: confine all low intensity starts, contain
moderate to high intensity starts, and control
only the starts which occur under extreme fire
weather conditions. Alternative 4: the same as 3
with the addition of an approved plan for
prescribed lightning fire management.
Alternatives 3 and 4 would be augmented by a
smaller prescribed burning program to meet average
annual burned area objectives, since more acres
will have been burned by wildfires and lightning
caused prescribed fires.

The Costs
All measurable variable costs must be included
in a CEA. Fixed costs, such as those for staffing
lookouts or firefighting units, do not have to be
included in the analysis as long as they remain
the same for each alternative. For example, the
appropriate suppression force staffing levels for
the Los Padres were determined through NFMAS and
by budget constraints. These levels are based on
an average of over 100 fires per year, while less
than 2 fires a year occur in the case study area.
Therefore, wilderness fire suppression strategies
will not affect forestwide personnel
requirements. The variable costs that must be
considered are annual suppression costs, NVCs, and
costs of any prescribed burns.

The Model
The model is a simplified representation of
the real world which includes all of the relevant
features. The role of the model is to predict the
costs of each alternative and the extent to which
each would meet management objectives (Quade
1967). Decision trees can be used to evaluate
alternative fire management programs in the face
of uncertainties about future fire occurrences,
weather, behavior, and sizes (Hirsch et al.
1981). Decision trees develop expected values,
which are probability weighted averages of all
possible outcomes. Probabilities are derived from
fire history records for fire management
planning. Cost and burned area figures can be
drawn from historic fire management records,
records of adjacent or comparable fire management
programs, or some form of fire gaming if no
historic or comparable records are available.
Every wildfire is a unique event and past fire
occurrences cannot be considered predictors of
future fires. Thus, "expected values" are not
predictions (actual future values may or may not
be similar), but they do provide relative values
for comparison. Therefore, decision trees make an
appropriate model for our CEA.
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A Criterion
The criterion for ranking alternatives is
dependent upon the agency's goals and objectives.
In wilderness fire management planning, many
different rankings are possible. Prescribed
lightning fire management might be justified even
if it was more costly than intensive suppression.
For example, the National Park Service considers
acres burned under natural conditions more
important than the cost of a fire management
program (Agee 1985). Both cost and burned area
are important considerations for Forest Service
wilderness fire management programs, so both
values must be developed.

THE LOS PADRES EXAMPLE
The decision tree for Alternative 1 of the Los
Padres study (table 1) illustrates the values and
probabilities which must be developed for a
wilderness fire management CEA. A decision tree
must be completed for each alternative, using the
same probabilities, but with different suppression
responses, and thus different cost and burned area
values. The probabilities for each branch of the
trees were calculated from the last 25 year fire
history of the San Rafael and Dick Smith
Wilderness Areas (including the proposed 16,500
acre--6,680 ha--addition to the San Rafael
Wilderness Area).
For the first branch of the trees, all 44
fires (34 lightning- and 10 person-caused fires)
were mapped by point of origin. Representative
fire locations (R.L.s) were chosen to represent
each historic fire (fig. 1). The probability of a
fire occurring at each R.L. was based on the
number of fires represented by that R.L. For
example, 13 fires are represented by R.L. 1, thus
13/44, or 0.296 is the probability of a fire
occurring under conditions represented by R.L. 1.
The second branch was the probability of
occurrence by cause. These probabilities were
dependent upon the fires represented by that R.L.
For example, 5 lightning- and 8 person-caused
fires were represented by location 1, thus the
probability of an R.L. 1 fire being caused by
lightning is 5/13, or .385.
For the third branch, the 1400-hr weather
observations from nearby weather stations were
retrieved for the day of ignition of each historic
fire and the following 30 days to develop
month-long weather patterns. Weather patterns
were divided into groups, based on the Santa
Barbara Ranger District's prescribed burn weather
parameters:
Low
Optimum
High
Fuel stick
1 hour
8
6
5
10 hour
14
9
7
100 hour
18
13
9
Live fuel moisture
110
70
60
Relative humidity (pct) 50
30
25
Wind speed (mi/hr)
0
5
13
Temperature (degrees F) 60
75
85
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These parameters represent a window of
environmental conditions which would allow for
safe management of a prescribed fire, but still
meet burned area objectives. Environmental
conditions must remain within these parameters
throughout the life of a fire for it to still be
"in prescription." Prescriptions must be modified
for site specific conditions and burn objectives,
but these general parameters were used to
distinguish fires burning under "good" conditions
(low to moderate fire intensity level) and fires
burning under "bad" conditions (high to extreme
intensity). Four weather patterns were
distinguished: (A) weather that started within
prescription parameters and continued within these
parameters for at least two weeks (a good-good
pattern); (B) weather that started within
prescription, but soon moved out of prescription
(a good-bad pattern); (C) weather that started

out of prescription, but soon cooled to within
prescribed conditions (a bad-good pattern); and
(D) weather that started out of prescription and
stayed out (a bad-bad pattern). These patterns
were then used to calculate the probability of
lightning- and person-caused fires occurring under
each pattern (table 1). For example, 15 of the 34
lightning fires occurred under "good-good" weather
patterns so the probability is 0.441.
Once probabilities have been calculated, cost
and burned area values must be developed for
probability weighting. These values should
represent the range of potential fire costs and
sizes. Saveland (1986) used average costs and
sizes drawn from similar fire management programs
on adjacent wilderness lands. To date, no contain
or confine suppression responses, lightning fire
management, or prescribed burns have been

Table 1--The decision tree for Alternative 1 of the Los Padres CEA, representing the control of all fires.

1

Weather patterns are divided into four groups based on prescribed burn parameters: A = good-good weather
pattern; B = good-bad weather pattern; C = bad-good weather pattern; D = bad-bad weather pattern.

2

Suppression response options include: control (CR); contain (CA); confine (CF); or prescribed lightning
fire management (Px).

USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-109. 1989
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attempted in southern California wilderness.
Thus, a fire gaming approach was taken.
Fire gaming is the prediction of
representative fire sizes by fire management
professionals. Predictions are based on the
interactions of estimated fire behavior conditions
and given suppression force responses (Harrod and
Smith 1983). It is an acceptable technique to
predict final fire sizes and costs, and has been
used for Forest Service fire management planning
in the past (Joseph and Gardner 1981). Gaming
accuracy is dependent upon the abilities and
knowledge of the fire garners (Harrod and Smith
1983). The Los Padres fire management personnel
participated in fire games for the 1980 National
Forest budgeting process. A 1982 fire started
near a gamed location and under similar weather
conditions. The resulting 825-acre (335-ha) fire
was very similar in both costs and size to the
gamed fire. The same gaming team (as many of the
members as possible) was reassembled to game
representative fires for our study.

Fire gamers include the Forest's Fire
Management Officer (F.M.O.), the Assistant F.M.O.,
the Fuels Management Officer, the recently retired
Fire Prevention Officer ("Budget 80" games
leader), and two District F.M.O.s (one recently
retired). All but the Forest F.M.O. were involved
in the 1980 games so little training was
necessary.
Gaming materials include 15-minute topographic
maps and aerial photographs of the R.L.s and
adjacent areas, Mylar (clear plastic) overlays,
representative weather patterns (one pattern from
each of the four categories was chosen for each
R.L.), a list of the resources that would be
dispatched initially to each R.L. (based on the
Forest's current dispatch plan), a fire history
map which includes all fires 300 acres (121 ha) or
greater that occurred in the study area since
records were started, and assorted tabulation
sheets to record resources used, hours, miles of
travel, and other suppression costs that would be
encountered during the life of each "gamed fire"
(Harrod and Smith 1983).

Figure 1--The last 25 year fire history of the
Dick Smith and San Rafael Wilderness Areas and the
corresponding representative fire locations.
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Actual games consisted of first mapping an
overlay of the free-burning fire spread (without
any suppression efforts) from time of ignition to
report and then for a series of time periods
thereafter. Fire spread rates were determined
from the computer program "Firecast" (Cohen 1983)
based on slope and fuel conditions at the R. L.,
and the given weather pattern. Spread rates were
subjectively modified by garners to account for
changes in fuel conditions, local weather
patterns, diurnal weather changes, and changes in
topography as fires spread. Four weather patterns
were gamed at each location. Fires started under
"good" weather conditions were then gamed four
times: controlled, contained, confined, and
managed as a prescribed fire. Fires starting
under "bad" conditions were only controlled and
contained since these fires would be out of
prescription, and good weather would be necessary
to confine fires in these unbroken fuelbeds.

Table 3--Average annual cost, cost per area
managed, average annual burned area, and average
annual cost per area burned for four alternative
fire management programs for Representative Fire
Location 1 of the Dick Smith and San Rafael
1
Wilderness Areas

Average
annual
cost
Historical (before
suppression)
Alternative 1
$15,650
Alternative 2

$15,096

Alternative 3

$13,898

Alternative 4

$13,908

PRELIMINARY RESULTS
The results of the fire gaming for R.L. 1 and
some preliminary gaming results for R.L. 2 are
presented in table 2. The R.L. 1 values were then
run through the appropriate decision tree for
their use and preliminary expected values for
average annual cost and burned area were
calculated (table 3). For example, all fires were
controlled in Alternative 1, thus the control
gaming results were used throughout this tree
(table 1). Alternative 2 results represent the
containment of both fires which started under good
weather conditions and the control of the two
which started under bad conditions. Alternative 3
results represent the confinement of the first two
fires and the containment of the latter two.
Alternative 4 results were calculated similar to
the third, except that 25 percent of the low
intensity lightning caused fires (both good
conditions) were considered prescribed fires.
Table 3 also compares each alternative's cost
per area managed and average annual cost per

Average
Average
annual
Cost per annual cost per
acre
burned
burned
(ha)
acre
acre
managed
(ha)
(ha)

$0.23
($0.57)
$0.22
($0.55)
$0.20
($0.50)
$0.20
($0.50)

1500+
(607+)
21.0
(8.5)
21.0
(8.5)
153.1
(62.0)
153.1
(62.0)

$745
($1841)
$719
($1776)
$91
($224)
$91
($224)

1

Representative Fire Location 1 represents 29.6
percent of the case study fires, thus figures are
calculated from 29.6 percent of the 231,500 acre
(93,687 ha) site, or 68,500 acres (27,722 ha).

burned area for fires represented by R.L. 1. The
figures for cost per area managed are based on
68,500 acres (27,722 ha), or 29.6 percent of total
wilderness.
NVCs are determined by the size and intensity
level of each gamed fire. The Los Padres
currently calculates these values for all 300+
acre (121 ha) fires. Only three gamed fires
burned more than 300 acres at R.L. 1 and these
were in a "low valued" watershed. Thus, the NVC's
for R.L. 1 do not have much effect on our
preliminary expected annual costs. NVCs will be

Table 2--Final size and cost figures for gamed fires.
CONTROL
Size
Cost
(acres)
($)
Representative fire location 1
Good-good weather pattern
Good-bad weather pattern
Bad-good weather pattern
Bad-bad weather pattern
1
Representative fire location 2
Good-good weather pattern
Good-bad weather pattern

CONTAIN
Size
Cost
(acres)
($)

CONFINE
Size
Cost
(acres)
($)

Px Lightning Fire
Size
Cost
(acres)
($)

0.5

6,351

0.5

3,883

4.0

2,919

4.0

10.0
118.0
40.0

7,230
74,942
32,238

10.0
270.0
390.0

4,365
45,791
39,086

457.0

6,135
N/G
N/G

457.0

0.5
66.7

2,903
36,759

0.5
780.0

2,548
41,367

2

99.0
3,038
2300+
100,000+

3,207
6,622
N/G
N/G

738.0

28,697

1

Cost figures for representative fire location 2 have not been formally reviewed by the fire garners, thus
they are subject to minor changes. However, the relationships between responses will probably not change.

2

The confine fire game for good-bad weather at R.L. 2 has not yet been completed, but the fire will be over
2,300 acres and will probably cost over $100,000. The prescribed fire game has not been started.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-109. 1989
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important cost considerations when more valuable
watersheds become involved.

confinement and prescribed lightning fires are
becoming much higher at R.L. 2, and the higher
pattern is probably more representative of these
wildernesses.

DISCUSSION
The values presented in table 3 are only
preliminary results as they represent only one
R.L. And, R.L. 2 results cannot be run through
the decision trees until all of the games for that
R.L. have been completed. The values in table 3
are provided to illustrate calculation techniques
and some of the results that can be developed
through this type of CEA. Expected annual
suppression costs and burned areas will be much
higher when the decision trees are completed, and
the relationships between the alternatives will
probably change. Therefore, comparisons of these
preliminary values are difficult to justify since
they are based on such a small database (one
series of games).
Despite this small database, some patterns
have become evident. Many fire management
personnel consider the use of confinement or
prescribed lightning fire management impossible in
decadent chaparral fuelbeds (for example, two fire
garners before our games began). Both responses
were successful at R.L. 1 (the least expensive
response under good-good weather and only slightly
more expensive than containment under good-bad).
This R.L. is covered by fairly young (22-year-old)
mixed chaparral. The relatively light fuels and
extraordinarily high humidities in both good
weather patterns helped confine the fires. This
pattern is not being repeated at R.L. 2, where
confinement and prescribed lightning fires are
becoming the most expensive responses. These
results suggest that confinement or prescribed
lightning fire management will not be cost
effective, at least until much more of these
decadent fuelbeds are broken up by younger fuel
mosaics and our ability to reliably forecast
weather conditions increases.
Containment was feasible under moderate
conditions at R.L. 1 (little more than half of the
cost of control under good-good weather, and the
least expensive response under good-bad), and this
pattern is continuing at R.L. 2 (though it was
slightly more expensive than control under the
moderate intensity, good-bad fire at R.L. 2).
Containment was also the least expensive response
under the highest intensity fire gamed thus far
(bad-good weather at R.L.1), which suggests that
containment could provide some substantial fire
suppression savings on fires in these
wildernesses. This pattern will be closely
monitored in future games, as more data will be
necessary for validation of this finding.
Expected annual burned areas illustrated the
anticipated pattern of more area burned under the
less intensive suppression responses. The annual
expected burned area for alternatives 3 and 4 is
somewhat low. But, this can be attributed to the
young fuels and high humidities which led to
moderate burning conditions. Gamed fire sizes for
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Some unanticipated, but valuable observations
of these early fire games are not directly related
to our CEA. The garners--all "old-school"
firefighters--originally raised questions about
the feasibility of containing or confining
chaparral fires. Our games compelled these fire
managers to consider what they would do when
required to use these responses in the field,
either through policy or when suppression forces
are not available.
Another important finding of our preliminary
games is the value of the Forest's pre-attack
manuals. During the 1960's and early 1970's, the
Los Padres was divided into "pre-attack blocks".
Each block was mapped, marked, and signs were
posted designating potential dozer lines, hand
lines, helispots, water sources, fire camp
locations, and other valuable fire suppression
information. These plans have recently been
discarded by many fire management staffs, but have
proved invaluable to the garners for the
confinement and containment responses. This
suggests that if appropriate suppression responses
are ever to be utilized on the Los Padres, these
manuals should be updated and made more readily
available to fire management personnel. Even if
control remained the most appropriate suppression
response for the Forest, up-dated pre-attack
manuals would be valuable tools for prescribed
burn managers.

SUMMARY
In summary, cost-effectiveness analysis is
appropriate for wilderness fire management
planning. Decision trees help us predict future
fire occurrence potentials, and intensive gaming
efforts can help us predict fire sizes and costs
associated with the implementation of appropriate
suppression responses and prescribed lightning
fire management. These values are important to
land managers who are now faced with the
cost-effective management of natural fire regimes
in chaparral wilderness. This type of analysis is
especially valuable for southern California land
managers who have little field experience with any
fire management program other than intensive
suppression efforts and off-season prescribed
burning, especially given the risks associated
with fire in volatile chaparral ecosystems. Fire
games are not only providing a valuable evaluation
of appropriate suppression responses and
prescribed lightning fire management, but are also
proving educational to "old school" fire
management personnel and illustrating some
potentially cost effective alternatives to
intensive suppression efforts.
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